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The Arab Uprisings: 
Revolution or Protests?
George Lawson 
Recent years have seen a surge in radical protest, from Occupy Wall Street to Indian Naxalites, from North African youth to Chilean teachers, and from Muslims in Xinjiang 
to indigenous peoples in the Pacific. The uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa 
during 2011 provide the most potent articulation of these multiple sites of protest.
In carrying out an assessment of the Arab uprisings, it is worth recalling that very few such movements 
lead to successful revolutions. Crucial to revolutionary success are three factors: first, levels of state 
effectiveness (in particular, the resilience of intermediary institutions which can channel grievances 
between state and society); second, the degree of elite fracture (particularly its hold over the coercive 
apparatus); and third, the commitment of the opposition (both in terms of its ideological unity and its 
organisational capacity). Although the first two of these factors have remained consistent features of 
revolutionary movements over time, the third has changed markedly. In particular, there appears to be 
little adhesive within contemporary revolutionary ideologies that can act as the binding agent of a new 
social order. This means that, for all the amendable conditions for revolution today, and for all the willing 
capacity of many movements to demand radical change, there is little sense of what an alternative order 
would look like once such processes have taken place. This too is the case with the 2011 uprisings. 
On the one hand, therefore, there is considerable scope in the contemporary world for revolutionary 
challenges to occur. On the other hand, many of the movements that promote radical change lack a 
sense of how social relations could – and should – be re-ordered. These issues form the background 
to any assessment of how the 2011 Arab uprisings emerged, how they are developing, and what their 
outcomes are likely to be. 
NEGOTIATED REVOLUTIONS 2.0?
The Arab uprisings sit downwind from the ‘negotiated revolutions’ that accompanied the end of the Cold 
War in 1989. Negotiated revolutions shifted the meaning and character of revolution in two main ways: 
first, because negotiated revolutions were rooted in movements for political justice rather than driven 
by programmes of economic and social transformation, they sought to limit rather than extend state 
power; second, because both sides of the struggle sought recourse via negotiation rather than armed 
conflict, non-violence became their dominant trope. The result of these dynamics was that negotiated 
revolutions strengthened rather than challenged liberal international order.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, it was easy to see the appeal of negotiated revolutions. Uprisings in 
Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and elsewhere chimed with the spread of liberal international order. It was, 
therefore, little surprise that the 2011 Arab uprisings shared considerable overlaps with negotiated 
revolutions, including the promotion of non-violent protest, an ethos of democratisation, and a 
transformation rooted in negotiation rather than military victory. 
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However, the Arab uprisings also led to discussions 
over whether a further amendment to revolutionary 
anatomies was being constructed, particularly when 
it came to the use of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) such as Twitter, Facebook and 
YouTube. Do the Arab uprisings represent a shift in 
the anatomies of revolution, perhaps marking the 
advent of negotiated revolutions 2.0?
REVOLUTIONARY SITUATIONS
Before examining the role played by ICTs in the Arab 
uprisings, it is worth exploring the basic causes of the 
uprisings themselves. Although the uprisings were 
surprising, they were not out of keeping with the 
revolutionary pathways associated with negotiated 
revolutions. First, there was a weakening of state 
effectiveness. For example, in Egypt, the strong links 
between the elite, the United States and Israel were 
deeply unpopular amongst the general public. In the 
years leading up to the Arab uprisings, Egypt was the 
second largest recipient of US aid (worth around $1 
billion dollars each year in military aid alone), one of the 
main sites for the torture and rendition of suspected 
Al-Qaeda suspects, and a supporter of Israeli policies 
in the region, including the blockade of Gaza. Such 
policies generated a sense of distance between the 
regime and the people. 
Most important, however, in the weakening of 
state effectiveness was the legacy and evolution 
of the ‘revolutions from above’ which these states 
experienced during the 1950s and 1960s. During the 
‘revolutions from above’, an ‘independent force’ of 
high ranking military officials and civilian bureaucrats 
seized power, using the state as a means by which to 
carry out projects of social transformation. For many 
years, these regimes appeared stable, so much so that 
much academic debate revolved around the resilience 
of authoritarianism in the Middle East. 
However, Middle Eastern states proved as vulnerable 
to revolution from below as the regimes they replaced 
were vulnerable to revolution from above. The lack of 
intermediate associations between state and society 
meant that there were few effective channels by which 
to meet grievances and institutionalise contestation. 
This served to ‘hollow out’ state-society relations, 
making regimes vulnerable to surges of discontent. 
States in the region could subjugate their people, but 
they lacked the institutional depth to regulate society 
efficiently. It was just these weaknesses which enabled 
revolutionary pressures to emerge during 2011. 
Egypt serves as a useful illustration of these dynamics. 
Before the 2011 revolution, the legitimacy of the 
Egyptian state rested on three main pillars: the 
1952 revolution; the role of the military in freeing 
Egypt from Western hegemony (the nationalisation 
and subsequent conflict over Suez being the most 
pertinent example); and the ‘socialist development’ 
policies pursued by Nasser, during which the state 
took over the planning, coordination, investment, 
and management of production.
As Toby Dodge points out in his Introduction to this 
report, these policies had the effect of demobilising 
social forces, including private landholders and the 
bourgeoisie, by using land reform and industrialisation 
as tools for exerting state authority over economic 
activities. They also led to reasonable levels of state-
led growth, fortified by price subsidies which made 
basic commodities affordable to the majority of the 
population. State income was further generated 
through petrodollars and aid, particularly from the 
US, which paid handsomely in exchange for Egypt’s 
recognition of Israel following the 1978 Camp David 
Accords, its opposition to Iran, the suppression of 
Islamists (including the execution of Sayyid Qutb – 
the ‘Islamist Lenin’), and the regular passage of US 
warships through the Suez Canal. 
The Egyptian state was, therefore, secured through an 
amalgam of state-led development and redistributive 
mechanisms. However, under Sadat and Mubarak, 
this legitimacy was eroded as the state came to be 
characterised more by repression than by popular 
mandate. Both Sadat (in 1977) and Mubarak (in 1986) 
deployed the army against domestic protestors. And 
after the assassination of Sadat by members of al-
Jihad in 1981, emergency laws made the state an 
everyday presence in people’s lives. A vast security 
establishment was constructed on the back of two 
million informants, who underpinned an extensive 
system of policing, state security, and state-sponsored 
gangs (baltagiya). 
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Even as Mubarak increased the despotic power of the 
state, he reduced its infrastructural reach through a 
range of neoliberal reforms. During the 1980s and 
1990s, Egypt reduced tariffs, abandoned interest rate 
controls, and removed import quotas. This served to 
intensify state dependence on oil rents and foreign 
aid, making the Egyptian economy more susceptible to 
external dynamics. A dip in oil prices during the mid-
1990s forced the state to further leverage its debt and 
reduce public expenditure. The subsequent austerity 
measures prompted a decline in living standards for 
many people, even as a ‘network of privilege’ (many 
of whom were associated with Gamal Mubarak, 
the President’s son), used personal connections with 
state brokers in order to secure lucrative contracts. 
Increasingly, this elite came to be seen as a minority 
caste operating outside, or on top of, civil society. 
Concurrent with these dynamics, demographic changes 
(particularly population growth) placed additional 
burdens on the state. By 2011, over one-third of the 
Egyptian population was aged 15-29. This exerted 
considerable pressures on job markets, just as the state 
was becoming more neoliberal, more personalistic, 
and more repressive. In 2009, unemployment in the 
region reached nearly 25 percent, twice the global 
average. It was much higher than this amongst young 
people and disproportionately felt within the middle 
class – college graduates in Egypt were ten times 
more likely to have no job as those with a primary 
school education. 
Short-term triggers added to the sense of state failure. 
Between 2008 and 2010, food prices increased by 
over a third. The removal of food subsidies by the 
state (the bread subsidy alone cost $3 billion per year 
to maintain) fuelled resentment against the regime. 
Despite the decline in its economic sovereignty after 
two decades or more of neoliberal reforms, the 
legitimacy of the Egyptian state was tightly bound 
with its capacity to deliver a basic standard of living. 
It was, therefore, particularly susceptible to such a 
crisis, particularly when it seemed to many Egyptians 
that the state had abandoned the poor for the sake 
of the rich. 
Despite this vulnerability, the Egyptian regime was slow 
to respond to the threat posed by the December 2010 
protests in Tunisia. Already under pressure following 
allegations of vote-rigging in the November 2010 
parliamentary elections, Mubarak did not react to 
the escalation of protests in the early part of 2011, 
even after Tunisian President Ben Ali resigned in mid-
January. As protests intensified, Mubarak’s hold on 
power weakened. The President promised to resign 
at the end of his term of office, while simultaneously 
ordering an escalation of violence against protestors. 
This combination of carrot and stick backfired, sapping 
Mubarak’s support within the police, his party, and the 
military. Large numbers of police failed to show up 
for work, took off their badges, or went over to the 
protestors. On February 5, the executive committee 
of the National Democratic Party resigned en masse. 
And as the protests escalated, the military, which 
had previously been cautiously neutral, first moved 
in to protect the protestors from state-sponsored 
violence and then, on February 10, publicly endorsed 
the people’s ‘legitimate demands’. Mubarak resigned 
the next day. 
The events leading up to the formation of a 
revolutionary situation in Egypt sit well within existing 
understandings of revolution:
 First, state effectiveness was weakened both 
through long-term dynamics (the closeness of elite ties 
to the United States and Israel, deepening inequalities 
between rich and poor, and the everyday brutality of 
the security apparatus) and short-term pressures (the 
spike in food prices, the 2010 rigged elections, and 
the protests in Tunisia).
 Second, Mubarak’s position was damaged by elite 
fracture, particularly within the coercive apparatus. 
The most important source of defection was the 
military – without their support, Mubarak’s position 
was untenable. 
 Third, the state was undermined by the 
resourcefulness of the opposition. The coalition that 
formed against Mubarak was made up of disparate 
forces: labour groups, urban youths, mosques, 
professionals, and the Muslim Brotherhood. At the 
same time, ‘revolutionary entrepreneurs’ connected 
opposition networks into a coherent coalition. These 
‘wired cosmopolitans’, mostly young, well-travelled, 
technologically-savvy professionals, ‘translated’ local 
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events for foreign media, establishing media centres 
which spread the revolutionary message through cell 
phones, YouTube, and Twitter. They also used ICTs to 
establish safety committees and other such bodies. 
Did the use of such technologies denote a shift in 
how revolutions unfold? 
REVOLUTIONARY TRAJECTORIES
One of the central features of revolutions is the 
formation of a close-knit oppositional identity centred 
on shared ‘stories’ which unite disparate groups behind 
a common cause. Eric Selbin describes the function of 
these stories as ‘tools of connection’ between everyday 
life and collective protest. During the Arab Spring, it 
is argued, ICTs served as these ‘tools of connection’, 
providing a means by which protest was organised 
and resistance was mobilised. Because ICT networks 
are meritocratic, informal, horizontal, and transparent, 
they are, it is argued, necessarily anti-authoritarian. 
And by sharing information both immediately and 
without official sanction, ICTs are said to foster a new 
type of politics, one which was indispensable to the 
Arab uprisings.
When and how do ICTs influence revolutions? Once 
again, it is worth examining the case of Egypt. There 
is little doubt that Facebook played some role in 
organising protests in Egypt. The Facebook group (‘We 
Are All Khaled Said’), established in commemoration 
of a blogger who was murdered by Egyptian police 
in 2010, gathered hundreds of thousands of 
members, many of whom took part in anti-regime 
demonstrations. This group also acted as a connecting 
node between domestic and transnational networks, 
helping to ratchet up pressure on elites around the 
world to ‘do something’. 
Such dynamics worried Arab states. At the end 
of January, the Egyptian government required the 
country’s four main Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
to disable their networks. All four ISPs, with the 
exception of Noor, the provider for the Egyptian Stock 
Exchange, complied. After five days, however, the 
government lifted its blockade, as it came to regard 
the ban as igniting rather than suppressing dissent. 
In other words, more people came onto the streets 
once the Internet had been disabled. This is a puzzling 
outcome given claims about the necessity of ICTs in 
mobilising protest. Protestors are supposed to have 
required ICTs in order to connect disparate networks 
and coordinate activities. Yet protests in Egypt 
intensified during the period in which the Internet 
was disabled. 
Perhaps, though, this is not such a puzzle. As 
even the most enthusiastic cyber-utopians accept, 
digital data leaves an audit trail, one which can be 
used for surveillance and censorship as well as for 
decentralisation and transparency. Social media is a 
tool which has been appropriated by authoritarian 
governments in order to trace protestors, spread 
propaganda, and monitor the activities of protest 
groups. Indeed, this is something which many activists 
themselves appear to recognise. For example, in 
January 2011, a pamphlet, entitled ‘How to Protest 
Intelligently’, was circulated widely amongst protest 
groups in Egypt. The pamphlet explicitly asked 
protestors not to use Twitter, Facebook, YouTube or 
other websites because, ‘they are all monitored by 
the Ministry of the Interior’. 
Examples elsewhere bolster this point. After the 2009 
uprising, the Iranian government formed a cybercrime 
unit charged with countering the ‘American led cyber-
war’ and arresting those guilty of spreading ‘insults 
and lies’ about the regime through the Internet. The 
Chinese government regularly interferes with the 
working of the Internet and email accounts, and 
has become adept at initiating ‘online blockades’, 
particularly around the unrest in Xinjiang. At the same 
time, the Internet has proved to be a valuable source 
of authoritarian propaganda. Vladimir Putin’s United 
Russia party, for example, enjoys an extensive online 
presence, while Hugo Chavez is an accomplished user 
of Twitter, sending out regular missives to his two 
million plus followers. In short, authoritarian regimes 
are skilled practitioners when it comes to adopting 
‘networked’ techniques of surveillance and control. 
On the one hand, then, ICTs can help to coordinate 
revolutionary protests. On the other, they can 
equally well be used to disrupt these protests. In 
short, ICTs have no independent agency – they are 
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tools which operate within broader circuits of power. 
 As Malcolm Gladwell has pointed out, ICTs are good 
at generating ‘weak ties’ – networks of acquaintances 
which ‘like’ or ‘share’ the same tastes. But they are 
poor at fostering ‘strong ties’ – the deep connections of 
solidarity and commitment which undergird collective 
protest. This latter form of connection, best rooted in 
personal ties of family and friendship, or in the midst of 
struggle, is not easily forged. To the contrary, it costs. 
And it is not something that ICTs do well.
 
REVOLUTIONARY OUTCOMES
What, then, are the likely outcomes of the Arab 
uprisings? In many ways, it is too early to tell. If the 
minimum condition of revolutionary outcomes is the 
period in which a revolutionary regime takes control of 
the principal means of production, means of violence, 
and means of information in a society, only one state 
has reached this point. Tunisia has overthrown its 
former regime, held free and fair elections, and handed 
power over to a new civilian authority. However, as 
detailed elsewhere in this report, Tunisia’s revolution 
is by no means complete. 
Nonetheless, Tunisia is an island of relative tranquillity in 
an otherwise turbulent sea. In Egypt, the SCAF remains 
in charge, albeit in uneasy truce with Islamist forces. 
Bahrain’s uprising was crushed by a combination of 
monarchical obduracy and Saudi force. The Saudi’s 
themselves only mollified domestic unrest through a 
reform package worth over $150 billion. This strategy, 
on a lesser scale, was also initiated in Kuwait, Morocco, 
and Jordan, with similar results: the decompression of 
protest. In other states, instability remains the main 
consequence of the uprisings – varying degrees of 
civil strife besets Syria, Libya, and Yemen. 
Overall, therefore, none of the states in the region bar 
Tunisia meet even the minimum criteria of revolutionary 
success, let alone their ‘maximum condition’ – the 
institutionalisation of a new political, economic, and 
symbolic order. Although there is increasing talk of 
a ‘Turkish’ or ‘Indonesian model’ which combines ‘a 
pious society within a democratic state’, the region 
as a whole is stuck between fragile pacts, illiberal 
renewal, and unmet grievances. 
BACK TO THE FUTURE OF REVOLUTION 
As noted above, the lack of systemic transformation 
wrought by the Arab uprisings is something common 
to many contemporary revolutions. This is because 
the meaning and character of revolution itself has 
changed, becoming increasingly oriented around 
political representation rather than the reordering of 
society. As such, revolutions have become deliberately 
self-limiting, seeking to restrain revolutionary excess 
within constitutional limits. 
This shift away from revolutions as processes of 
social transformation is not wholly new. It speaks 
to a genealogy which runs through America in 
1776, the Springtime of Nations in 1848, and the 
negotiated revolutions in 1989. These self-limiting 
revolutions centre on individual rather than collective 
emancipation, seeing the latter as a cloak for 
revolutionary despotism. The 2011 Arab uprisings 
sit within this alternative tradition of revolution. 
Mike Davis makes an arresting comparison in this 
regard, examining parallels between the protagonists in 
2011 and 1848: Egypt and France as the ‘revolutionary 
vanguards’; Saudi Arabia and Russia as the ‘counter-
revolutionary powers’; Turkey and England as the 
‘models of success’; Palestine and Poland as the 
‘romantic lost causes’; and Serbia and Shia groups 
as the ‘angry outsiders’. As Davis, following Marx, 
also notes, no revolution in Europe, whether liberal 
or socialist, could succeed until Russia was either 
defeated or revolutionised. The same may be true 
of Saudi Arabia in its region. It is also worth noting 
that, although the revolutions of 1848 were defeated 
in the short-term, their main rationale of political 
liberalisation was successful in the long run. That 
too may be the case with the 2011 Arab uprisings.■ 
